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"Oh no: We've Got a Problem"
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ABSTRACT
This research examined 230 reports in NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System's (ASRS) database to develop
a better understanding of factors that can affect flight crew performance when crew are faced with inflight aircraft
malfunctions. Each report was placed into one of two categories, based on severity of the malfunction. Report
analysis was then conducted to extract information regarding crew procedural issues, crew communications and
situational awareness. A comparison of these crew factors across malfunction type was then performed. This
comparison revealed a significant difference in ways that crews dealt with serious malfunctions compared to less
serious malfunctions. The authors offer recommendations toward improving crew perfornmnce when faced with
inflight aircraft malfunctions.
INTRODUCTION
Research from a major aircraft manufacturer states that a large number of aircraft accidents attributed to human
error begin with an aircraft malfunction. (Wiegers and Rosman, 1986) Several of these accidents have been caused
bv the flieht crew's fixation on the aircraft malfunction, which resulted in their overall loss of situational awareness.
E_xamole_'include the December 1972 Eastern Air Lines L1011 crash in the Florida Everglades, and the December
1978 United Air Lines DC8 accident in Portland, Oregon. Both of these accidents are now well known cases, and
are frequently cited in Crew Resource Management (CRM) classes worldwide.
The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database contains thousands of reports that cite aircraft
malfunctions. This large number of related incident reports creates fertile ground for exploration of flight crew
perfonnance during aircraft malfunctions.
OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
The objectives of this research study were twofold: to develop a better understanding of factors - both positive
and negative - that can affect crew performance when faced with inflight aircraft malfunctions, and to offer
recommendations designed to improve crew performance during these condttions.
In order for an ASRS report to be included in the study set, it must have involved a crew size of at least two
pilots (including instructional flights) and involved the actual or perceived inflight malfunction of a major aircraft
system or subsystem. Further it was stipulated that the mechanical malfunctton must have created a relatively
prolonged period of demand on aircrew communications, attention and procedures after the mechanical malfunction
was discovered by the crew. This was to eliminate those situations that were immediately resolved by flight crew
" " " .... " V r _,3reflex action such as a runaway stabfltzer rnalfunctlon, or an autopflot hardo e.
APPROACH
Data
Our data set consisted of 230 ASRS reports that were submitted to ASRS between May 1986 and August 1994.
The researchers were well aware that ASRS data, including those in this study, may reflect reporting biases.
Chappell (1994) notes that reporters incident descriptions are influenced by their individual motivations for
reporting, and that reports often give only one perspective of the event which is not balanced by additional
investigations or verification. Not withstanding these caveats, Chappell states, 'If large numbers of reports on a
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topic are available, it is reasonable to assume that consistently reported aspects are likely to be true. It is doubtful
that a large number of reporters would exaggerate or report erroneous data fn the same way" (pp. 154-155).
Method
Prior to initiating this research the investigators turned to several sources to dete.rna.ine the type ofinfor_nation
that should be gathered to evaluate crew performance. One helpful source was FAA Advisory Circular At_ I zo-a 1_,
Crew Resource Management Training, which notes that many successful CRM programs use three key cluster
areas to evaluate flight crew performance: (1) Communications Processes and Decision Behavior, (2) Team Building
and Maintenance, and (3) Workload Management and Situational Awareness.
The next step was to develop an extensive listing of potential aircraft malfunctions that researchers expected to
find in their review of ASRS reports. Each of these potential aircraft malfunctions was then placed into one of two
categories, depending on severity of the malfunction. This was done to allow statistical comparison of crew
performance when dealing with serious problems versus less serious problems.
Type A malfunctions were those that we judged as being quite serious and posing the real or perceived threat of
loss of life or equipment, (e.g., engine fire or failure, inability to extend landing gear and major flight control
problems that grossly affect the ability to control the aircraft.). Type B malfunctions were those that were deemed to
be less serious in nature. (e.g., flap problems, air-conditionmg mal.functions .and minor hydraulic system
malfunctions.) We further distinguisheii Type A and Type B malfunctions.by noting that malfunctions placed m _e
former category are resolved by many air carriers by use of "Emergency" Checklists, while those placed into the
latter category are resolved by "Abnormal" Checklists.
By use of a six-page questionnaire, bits of relevant information were extracted from each ASRS report in the data
set. The reports were analyzed as to which type of malfunction occurred and what crew tactors were present. A
comparison of crew factors across malfunction types was then performed.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Ninety-five percent of ASRS reports in this study involved air carrier operations; 92 percent involved passenger
carrying operations. Two-thirds of these reports had a crew size of two pilots, while one-third involved three
crewmembers.
Malfunction type
Of the 230 reports in the data set, 199
cited single malfunctions and 31 cited
multiple malfunctions. Regarding multiple
malfunctions, one report referenced five
aircraft malfunctions, one cited four
malfunctions, five reports referenced three
malfunctions, and 24 reported dual
malfunctions.
By design, we sought to evaluate
approximately the same number of Type A
and Type B malfunction reports. Type A
malfunctions were noted in 105 of the 230
reports (46 percent) while Type B
malfunctions were prevalent in 112 of the
230 reports (48 percent). A combination of
Type A and Type B malfunctions were
found in 13 of the 230 reports (6 percent).
During analysis and throughout this paper
we reter to these as "Type C" reports. Table
Type A and B categories.
TYPE A MALFUNCTIONS (105 of 230 Reports)
Engine fire and other serious engine problems 72
requiring inflight shutdown
Landing gear - inability to extend (or verify down) 18
Smoke or fumes in cockpit or cabin 15
Rapid depressurization 4
Citations
TYPE B MALFUNCTIONS (112 of 230 Reports)
Air-conditioning/pneumatic/pressurization system 33
Flap and slat 23
Hydraulic 17
Landin_ [_ear - non-maior (anti-skidr brake pressure t 15
Table 1. Four most frequent aircraft malfunction citations for
Type A and B Malfunctions
1 shows the four most frequent citations4of aircraft malfunctions for
4 A citation is where an ASRS report stated (or cited) a particular situation or occurrence. A single ASRS report may reference more thanone
situation or problem. Therefore, the total citations may exceed the total number of reports. For example, one ASPS report cited a hydraulic
failure that resulted in the failure to properly extend the landing gear. In this example, one ASRS report yielded two "malfunction citations."
Note that the data base search techmques did not necessarily produce a representative sample of aircraft malfunction types (refer to footnote
3 for additional information).
Crew procedural issues
We were interested to see if
the crew followed prescribed
procedures to deal with these
malfunctions. 169 of the 230
reports in the data set provided
thxs information. Table 2
A B C TOTALS
Crew Followed Prescribed Procedures 90 54 5 149
Crew Did Not Follow Procedures 4 14 2 20
No Information Available 11 44 6 61
TOTALS 105 112 13 230
Table 2. Crew procedural usage according to malfunction type
compares the number of reports
where crews followed prescribed
procedures versus those reports
where crews did not. Examples
of improper procedural actions include failing to complete a checklist due to rushing, using the wrong checklist, and
turning off the operative generator after a generator malfunction was discovered.
Chi-square analysis revealed a significant difference b2etween Type A and Type malfunctions 5 regarding crews
following (and not following) prescribed procedures. X (df=2, N=230) =25.75, p <13.05.
Eighty-eight of the 230 reports provided information concerning whether or not an emergency was declared
following discovery of the mechanical malfunction. Of those 88 reports, 71 of the reporters specifically stated that
they declared an emergency, while 17 wrote that they did not declare an emergency. Of those 71 reports where an
emergency was declared, 40 indicated that an emergency was declared immediately or very soon after the problem
was detected. Nine of these reports noted that an emergency was declared after a delay of some length. After
discovering that their landing gear would not extend, one crew delayed declaring an emergency for 2 1/2 hours while
they circled to burn excess fuel. In two cases the crew did not declare an emergency until on short final approach,
andonly then because ATC positioned another aircraft onto the runway just ahead of them. Some reporters wrote in
retrospect: "Declaring an emergency mac have allowed us priorit-v handling, and hence, less traffic disturbance.
(ASR'S Record No. 211356) "i_ would fiave been much safer to i'nform ATE of our suspected problem early on."
(ASRS Record No. 152994)
Communications processes and decision behavior
Positive Communications (75 of 230 reports)
Captain's open solicitation of input
Briefing concerning planned actions, solutions, or crew coordination issues
Crewmembers providing input and/or voicing safety concerns
Active participation encouraged in decision-making process
38 of 75 reports)
26 of 75 reports)
20 of 75 reports)
9 of 75 reports)
Negative Communications (14 of 230 reports)
Captain not receptive to crewmember input ( 7 of 14 reports)
Strain or difficulty with crew communications / 5 of 14 reports,)Captain failed to keep others informed of intentions 2 of 14 reports)
Table 3. Citations concerning crew communications (information supplied in 89 of 230 reports)
Previous NASA research has shown that the type and quality of crew communications are predictors of crew
performance (Foushee & Manos, 1981; Foushee, Lauber, Baetge & Acomb, 1986). Because of this previous
research, andbecause the importance of crew communications is widely emphasized in effective CRM programs, we
were interested to see what crew communications information could be distdled from these ASRS reports. Only 89
of the study's 230 reports had information pertaining to crew communications. Reports citing instances of crews
using "positive" communication techniques outnumbered the reports of "negative" communications by a factor of
five to one. Table 3 describes some of the findings concerning crew commumcations.
Regarding the Captain's open solicitation of input (Positive Communications, Table 3), many reports indicated
that solicitation of t_nput was not just limited to cockpit crewmembers. Eight reports cited input from company
maintenance facilities via radio, while 7 reported radio calls to the company dispatcher for input. Flight Attendant
input was sought in 7 reports where information was needed about passenger status or problems visible in or from
the passenger cabin.
For each of the chi-square tests in this paper we computed these comparisons two separate ways. One comparison was made using Type A
B and C categories. Another comparison was made by first combiningA and C categories, and then comparim_ that grouo against the
category. The comparison was significant in both cases. Our rational-for combining _. and C categories was that, by definition, Type C
,nalfunctions were those that had a combination of Type A and B malfunctions. We [iypothesized that a crew who experienced both serious
and less-serious malfunctions would prioritize tasks and deal with the serious malfunction (Type A) first and most aggressively, then as
resources became available, begin dealing with the less-serious malfunction (Type B). In some cases dealing with more serious malfunction
preempted resolution of the less-serious malfunction. Therefore, we felt that combining Types A and C for these comparisons was logical.
In addition to previously discussed unknown and known reporting biases, certain caveats are in order when making statistical inferences from
these data First these reports represent only a norlion of the total number of all aircraft malfunctions that-have occurred Therefore
" ' . " , " I" .... • .
conclusions drawn from this analysis arc only valid for thc reports m this study, and are not necessarily valid for the totalpopulatlon of all
aircraft malflmct ons A so, carc m st bc taken not to assu ne a cause and effect relationship among the elcmcnts compared (Chappell, 1994).
Reporters exemplified positive communications/decision behavior with statements such as "decision making in a
collective environment, and coordination between us _and the cabin team) went extremely well.' (ASRS Record No.
204057) An example of a "negative communications citation came from a report where _e First Qfficer ".mformed
the Captain that he was not comfortable with the situation, but the Captain continued the night desptte me input.
Workload management and situational awareness
Schwartz (1986) identified 25
ten items that may serve as
clues to mark loss of flight crew
situational awareness. Schwartz 20
referred to these as elements of
an "error chain." By slightly
modifying this list we used its 15
components to seek evidence of
crewmember loss of situational
awareness for reports in this 10
study. At least one "error chain"
element was identified by this
research team in 73 of the 230
reports. Figure 1 depicts the
error chain clues, along with the
number of their citations
according to Type A, B, a_d C
maifunctaon classifications.
[] • []IIType A Type B Type C
5
0 !
Ambiguity Distractioa l_nreu)lve_ Fixation _ ._NpOn_ Work Cemphtcency Hurryingrl3qng AJC OverloadUlscTepllncJes
Figure 1. Citations of"Error Chain" clues (information supplied in 73 of
230 reports)
We theorized that having a number of simultaneous
error chain clues could have a cumulative effect on
decreasing crew performance during the resolution of
malfuncUons. Table 4 depicts the number of these
simultaneous error chain clues, according to malfunction
type. To determine if the number of simultaneous error
chain clues was dependent of malfunction type, we
performed a chi-square test for independence. This test
showed a signi(tzcant difference between Type A and B
malfunctions. X (df=4, N=230) =31.12, p < .05.
Adverse safety problems
A B C TOTALS
One Clue 13 16 3 32
Two Clues 4 10 2 16
Three Clues 1 12 0 13
Four Clues 0 10 0 !0
Five Clues 1 3 0 4
Six Clues 0 1 0 1
TOTALS 19 52 5 76
Table 4. Number of simultaneous error chain clues
present according to malfunction type
We were interested to see if the attention
demands on the flight crew durin_ ADVERSE SAFETY PROBLEM A B C TOTALS
resolution of the aircraft malfunction causea Altitude deviations 0 14 2 16
any adverse safety consequences. Of the 230 Non-adherence to ATC clearance 0 11 2 13
reports reviewed in this research, 192 (83 e ' _, v" ti 0
. . Cours /track/heading, de ta ons 9 2 11
percent) provtded no evidence of any further _,I...... i;....... ;,t, _Apo/cnp_ n 7 1
consequences or safety pronlems, t ne - • 7 _ # ,_ o
remairiing 38 (17 perce-nt)-led to sundry Other __ __ _v o_
problems. Table 5 shows the distribution ot TOTALS 3 46 7 56
adverse safety consequence citations. We
statistically compared two elements of this Table 5. Number of adverse safety consequences according to
catego - altitude deviations and __,t ....r_ ....... , , _ nlattunctlon t3'De
course/track/heading devmttons - to _OOKIor ---
significant differences between Type A and
B malfunction types. Chi-square tests show a significant difference bet,_een Type A and B malfunctions for both of
these adverse safety consequencc _tems. For altitude deviations, X" (df=l, N=230) =9.68, p < .05, and for
course/track/heading deviations X (dr=l, N=230) =6.16, p < .05.
6 It should be noted that these error chain clues arc not mutually exclusive and some are closely related (for example, "distraction" and "no-
one flying the aircraft"). During analysis we took measures to ensure that'we had not simply "double coded" related error chain clues, thus
artificmlly increasing their count.
7 Included in the "'other" category arc reports of passenger or crew injury and aircraft damage.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
When viewed universally (looking at all reports in the dataset collectively), these data indicate that a large
number of reports (83 percent) did not report any adverse safety consequences such as altitude deviations, aircraft
damage, or passenger or crew injuries. Further, of those reports where information could be extracted conceming
crew procedural issues, 88 percent revealed that crews followed prescribed procedures when faced with inflight
aircraft malfunctions. Howe:ver, unlike some businesses where alcove 80 percent may be considered "a passing.
" .... rescore, aviation demands that safety margins be held to the highest values. Recently, the U.S. Sec tary ot
Transportation held an industry-wide safety conference where he presented a challenge to industry to accept a goal of
"zero accidents' (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1995). There is certainly room for improvement regarding crew
performance during aircraft malfunctions.
Chi-square analysis revealed a highly significant difference (at the .05 level I between Type A and B malfunction
categories in the areas of crew procedural issues, simultaneous error chain clues and adverse safety consequences
(altitude and course/track/heading deviations.) This provides strong statistical indications that Type .A and Type B
malfunctions are different populations. The extremely small chi-square probabilities derived indicate that the type ot
malfunction experienced may be related to adherence to procedures, and other as yet unknown factors.
Additionally, a much less sophisticated look at raw numbers also points to some interesting observations.
Merely totaling the number of error chain clue citations (Figure 1) shows that there were 25 citations for the 105
Type A malfunction reports, but 125 citations existed for the 112 Type B reports. Totaling the number of citations
for adverse safety consequences also shows similar results (Table 5). For the 105 Type A reports there were 3
citations, while the 112 Type B reports had 46 adverse safety consequence citations.
The research team suggests that the widespread differences between these categories may be due to crew
perception of the malfunction, as well as training. When faced with major mechanical malfunctions such as engine
fires or complete loss of major aircraft systems, crews typically resort to highly practiced rules-basedprocedures, use
of CRM principles, and some degree of heightened awareness. From analy.sis of this rese..arch, we meorize that the
way a crew perceives a mechanical malfunction to some extent determines the way they wtll cleal wath the problem;
i.e., serious problems demand a high degree of procedural usage and crew coordination, whereas less serious
problems pose little threat so they can be handled less formally.
Rasmussen's skill-rule-knowledge (SRK) classification of human performance can be used to further explain these
differences in crew perfonnance (PSasmussen, 1993). Clearly, the majority of Type A malfunctions could be resolved
by rules-based behavior, i.e., at the indication of an engine fire, crews should accomplish the tollowing ny
immediate recall: thrust lever - closed, start lever - cutoff, engine fire handle - pull, engine fire bottle - discharge.
Conversely, the nature of many of this study's Type B malfunctions had resolution procedures that were not as
clear, and therefore may have required crews to revert to knowledge-based behavior. This level of behavior can
require individuals to devote great amounts of time and effort to prol_erl_¢ assess and resolve the situation. On
occasion, this refocusing of tasks can result in reduced levels of proceaurat accomplishment, communications and
situational awareness.
Aoart from Line-Oriented Flight Trainin_ (LOFT) simulations, training and check flights almost invariably
involve handling of major mall_nctions, bu't have much less involvement with less sen_ous malfunctions. W'e
therefore suggest that emphasis be placed on enhancing the crew understanding that procedural issues and CRM
principals need to be employed when dealing with less serious malfunctions, just as they need to be used when
dealing with serious problems. We further recommend that developers of simulator training programs recognfize the
importance of simulating both serious and less serious malfunctions.
Error chain clues can denote reductions in, or loss of, situational awareness. We identified at least one error chain
clue in 73 of the 230 reports. Fixation, distraction, no one flying the aircraft and work overload were found in a
number of these reports, and are of particular concem because the7 have been identified .....
in many fatal aircraft accidents. In reports in this study, we noted with consistency the FATE
tendency ofcrewmembers to become absorbed with resoiv!ng the malfunction, often at F'i_ "
the expense of proper aircraft control. Stated one reporter, No doubt flying the aircraft Assess the situation
is the most important thing. We paid too much attention to a problem and forgot the Take appropriate action
most important thing - fly the airplane...One [person] should fly the airplane at all Evaluate the results.
times, while the other crewmember solves the problem." (ASRS Record No. 124063)
To minimize the possibility of such future occurrences, we recommend that crews practice controlling their FATE.
We further recommend that flight crew training emphasize that an aircraft malfunction can serve as an immediate
"red flag" to crewmembers, marking an occasion for possible loss of situational awareness.
Many air carriers utilize LOFT scenarios to allow crews to practice and critique their CRM skills, often during
simulahons of aircraft malfunction resolution. Several of the ASRS reports reviewed in this study provided a wealth
of information concerning problems encountered by crews dealing with malfunctions. Such reports are readily
available to developers of LOFT scenarios to help incorporate real scenarios that have caused real problems for real
crews.
One in ten of the 230 reports in this study provided evidence of crews using improper actions, such as not
completin_ a checklist due to rushing, using the wrong checklist, and activating the wrong system control switches.
Simdar situations can be preventedby insisting that all crewmembers verify intended actions before initiation.
Althoughcrewcoordinationa dverificationaretopicsusuallystressedin training,furnishingcrewswith thesefindingsmayhelpprovideinsighthatwhenfacedwith 'theheatof thebattle,crewsmayreactm a manner
contrarytotraining.If awarenessi thefirststeptowardbehavioralchange,thenarmingcrewswiththisknowledge
maybetterpreparethemtoavoidmakingthesesamemistakes.
Ofthe88reportsthatdescribedwhetherornotcrewsdeclaredanemergency,9 indictedthattheemergencywas
declaredaftera delay of some length. In two cases the reporters were forced to make this declaration at an
inopportune time, because ATC did not fully appreciate the nature of their problem. It is commonly accepted that
there exists a wide-spread reluctance within the pilot community to d..eclare an emergency. Often oted reasons for
failure to declare an emergency are "not wantinlz to fill out paperwork," and in general, not wanting to receive tocus
of attention from regulatory au'thorities or company management. It should be stressed with crews that the mere act
of declaring an emergency does not, in itself, generate the automatic requirement to complete paperwork.
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